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PRESENT AT THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA FOR ANTITRUST:
REFLECTIONS ON 1982-1983
Abstract
The early 1980s were an important time of transition for antitrust policy for the Antitrust
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.  I had the privilege to be selected to serve as the first "Chief
Economist" for the newly installed Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, William F. Baxter.  In this
essay I discuss some of the important achievements of that period, as well as some missed
opportunities.
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1PRESENT AT THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA FOR ANTITRUST:
REFLECTIONS ON 1982-1983
I.  Introduction
The early 1980s were an important time of transition for antitrust policy for the Antitrust
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).  With a new presidential administration came a new
Assistant Attorney General (AAG) for Antitrust, William F. Baxter.  I had the privilege of being
selected by Baxter to serve as his first "Chief Economist" in the capacity of the Director of the
Economic Policy Office (EPO) of the Division from mid January 1982 through the end of August
1983.
The changes in antitrust policy and enforcement were neither as sharp as some critics alleged
(and as some enthusiasts proclaimed) nor as mild as some "gradualists" might argue.  Nevertheless,
there were important initiatives and changes that occurred during that period, as well as some missed
opportunities.  In the remainder of this essay I will first discuss some of the major achievements of that
period, almost all of which involved active participation by the economists of the EPO, and then
discuss some of the disappointments and missed opportunities.
II.  The Achievements
1.  The Merger Guidelines, and market definition.
A major achievement of the early Baxter period was the development and promulgation of the
Merger Guidelines, which were issued in June 1982.  These Guidelines were technically a revision of
the Guidelines that had been issued in 1968.  But the 1982 document was so different in conceptual
2structure from its predecessor that few participants or commentators seriously thought of it as a
"revision;" instead, we all considered it to be a new document with a new approach.  These Guidelines
were subsequently revised in 1984 and 1992, with a small modification in 1997; but their essential
structure has remained intact in the seventeen years since their initial development.
Surely the most important advance in the Guidelines was the market delineation (or definition)
paradigm.  Prior to that time the conceptual basis for market delineation was, at best, limited.  Most
industrial organization economists understood that the definition of markets rested on cross-elasticities
of supply and demand: "The economic concept of a market is stated in terms of the behavior of buyers
and sellers.  Two products belong in the same market if a small change in price (or product) causes a
significant diversion in a relatively short time of the buyers' purchases or the sellers' production from
one product to another." (Kaysen and Turner, 1959, pp. 27-28).  Some empirical "rules of thumb" had
been offered (Elzinga and Hogarty, 1973; and Horowitz, 1981).  Market delineation for merger
analysis and enforcement by the Division and by the FTC was largely ad hoc.1
By contrast, the Guidelines offered a more solid conceptual foundation for market delineation:2
 Since the primary concern of merger enforcement is the prevention of mergers that create or enhance
market power, the appropriate or relevant market for merger analysis should generally be the smallest
                                               
     1 I can remember attending a seminar presentation on antitrust policy by George Hay, then Director
of EPO, in the spring of 1979 in which he described the market definition processes as being ad hoc
and in which indicia such as the presence of a trade association or an industry journal would be
important.
     2 As Werden (1993) has pointed out, Adelman (1959) had earlier suggested a similar formulation;
but (as of 1982) there was no one at the Division who knew of Adelman's suggestion.  And though
there apparently was an oral tradition concerning market definition that developed during George Hay's
tenure (1972-1979) as Director of the EPO, it was not readily accessible in early 1982.
3group of sellers that, if they coordinated their actions, could successfully (profitably) exercise market
power -- e.g., by raising prices by a small but significant amount and sustaining that higher level for a
significant period of time.  To be successful, this effort at collective exercise of market power would
not be thwarted by a sufficient number of buyers switching away to sellers of substitute products or to
sellers of the same product located elsewhere.  In essence, a relevant market is one that can be
successfully monopolized.
The focus on the sellers was an essential part of the paradigm; again, since the policy concern is
the exercise of market power and since it is sellers that exercise market power, the focus on sellers was
crucial.  But, where price discrimination among groups of buyers might be possible, then the
identification of a separate buyer group (identified by geographic location or by function -- e.g.,
wholesalers versus retailers) who might be the subject of the exercise of market power by the identified
group of sellers also constituted a relevant market.
The market delineation paradigm did not solve the problems of how to gather the data that
would be crucial for the empirical determination of markets for actual enforcement.  But it offered, for
the first time in a widely available policy-relevant document, sensible guidance as to the right questions
to be asked.
With the conceptual potential for monopolization established, the remainder of the Guidelines
established (along the lines suggested by Stigler [1964]) the principles that would help determine the
likelihoods of the post-merger exercise of market power: Were the merger partners selling in the same
market(s)?  What would be the post-merger level of overall seller concentration in each relevant
market, measured in terms of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)?  What changes in seller
concentration would occur as a consequence of the merger?  How easy is entry?  Are there other
4characteristics of the market -- the nature of the product, the numbers and types of buyers, the histories
and characteristics of the sellers -- that would make the post-merger exercise of market power more or
less likely?  And, in the spirit of Williamson (1968), are there readily identifiable efficiencies that would
arise from the merger that would provide a sufficient offset to any perceived likelihoods of the exercise
of market power.3
The first time that the Guidelines' market delineation paradigm was actually used for merger
enforcement, in June of 1982, was not a resounding success.4  The Division challenged a merger
between two modest-sized banks in southwestern Virginia,5 and actually did conduct a survey among
bank customers to try to determine the likelihoods of customers switching away to other banks in the
face of a rise in loan interest rates or a fall in deposit interest rates.  But Federal District Court Judge
Glen Williams was not convinced by the evidence, and the Division lost.6
Perhaps the best empirical implementation thus far of the Guidelines' market delineation
paradigm came in the FTC's 1997 challenge to the merger of Staples and Office Depot (Baker, 1998;
Dalkir and Warren-Boulton, 1999).7  At first glance the merger might have seemed unobjectionable,
                                               
     3 The 1982 version of the Guidelines embodied a skeptical attitude toward merger partners'
promises of efficiencies.  Subsequent versions have been somewhat more tolerant.
     4 See U.S. v. Virginia National Bankshares, Inc., 1982-2 Trade Cases 64,871.
     5 Ironically, this was one of the few cases where the Division was arguing for larger geographic
markets and the defendants were arguing for smaller markets (and claiming that each of the merger
partners were in separate, small markets and therefore did not compete with each other).
     6 A few years later, however, when the FTC challenged the proposed merger of Coca-Cola and Dr
Pepper, the Guidelines' structure and its market delineation paradigm importantly structured the FTC's
presentation of its case (White 1994, 1999b) and even Coca-Cola's defense; this time the Government
prevailed in Federal District Court.
     7 For a different view, see Werden (1999).
5since the two merger partners accounted for only a small percentage of all retail sales of office supply
products.  But simple price comparisons, as well as more sophisticated econometrics, demonstrated
that office supply superstores' (OSSs) sales in individual metropolitan areas constituted separate
relevant markets:  Where Staples or Office Depot was alone in a metropolitan area, its prices tended to
be higher than when a second OSS was also selling in the area, and prices were lower still when a third
OSS (Office Max) was in the area.  Market power could be and was in fact being exercised by OSSs in
these metropolitan areas.  Hence, they were relevant markets (and the merger would greatly exacerbate
seller concentration in these markets).8  Federal District Court Judge Thomas Hogan was convinced,
and the FTC won.9
If longevity is a relevant indicator, it is worth noting that (as of early 1999) the 1982 Guidelines
(with revisions) have now outlasted their 1968 predecessor by almost three years and still appear to be
providing strong guidance for merger analysis and enforcement.
2.  AT&T.
The AT&T case had been filed in October 1974 and had percolated for 6-1/2 years before
Baxter came to the Division.  Believing strongly in the case, he vowed to "litigate it to the eyeballs"
(Temin, 1987, p. 225).  After AT&T's motion for summary judgment was harshly rejected by Judge
Harold Greene in September 1981,10 AT&T quickly capitulated and settled on terms that achieved
virtually all of the Division's goals:11 the separation of the regulated monopoly local service markets
                                               
     8 For a different view, see Hausman and Leonard (1997).
     9 F.T.C. v. Staples, 970 F. Supp. 1066.
     10 U.S. v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336 (1981).
     11 The settlement was announced on January 8, 1982, two weeks before I came to the Division.  A
6from the actually or potentially competitive equipment and long-distance service markets, since
AT&T's control of the bottleneck local service, in conjunction with imperfect regulation of that service,
was likely to cause AT&T to distort and impede competition in the latter markets to benefit itself
(Brennan, 1987, 1990, 1995; Noll and Owen, 1994).  The settlement was implemented on January 1,
1984, and succeeded in restructuring the entire face of American telephone service (Temin, 1987).12
Unfortunately, the Division in the mid 1980s began to back away from the core principle that
had underlay the case and its settlement: keeping the regulated local service bottleneck monopolies out
of the competitive services.  By the early 1990s, however, the Division had returned to its earlier
stance.  The Telecommunications Act of 1996 continued to embody the basic spirit of the settlement,
though its supporters hoped to achieve the best of both worlds by encouraging entry into local service
and in turn allowing the local service providers into long distance.  Over three years later the Act has
achieved neither.
3.  Vertical restraints.
Perhaps the largest change in antitrust policy was occurring in the area of vertical restraints. 
Though the Supreme Court, in GTE-Sylvania13 in 1977, had declared territorial restraints to be subject
to a rule-of-reason analysis (and not a per se violation, as it had declared only ten years earlier in
                                                                                                                                                      
prior conflict (I had consulted briefly for AT&T on the case in 1977) caused me to be recused from the
detailed discussions in 1982-1983 that implemented the basic settlement.
     12 Along with the corporate restructuring came greater transparency as to the cross-subsidy that had
been embedded in telephone prices.  The implicit "separations" allocations of the pre-divestiture AT&T
were replaced by explicit access charges that were mandated by the FCC and paid by the long-distance
companies to the local operating companies.
7Schwinn14) and the Court had been slowly backing away from the harsh per se approach that it had
applied in 1958 to tying in Northern Pacific,15 antitrust policy was still generally hostile to vertical
restraints.  All forms of resale price maintenance (RPM) were still per se illegal and were often
described as "vertical price-fixing" (which conveyed the impression that RPM was the conceptual
equivalent of "smoke-filled-room" horizontal price fixing among competitors), and the Division had
succeeded in a criminal conviction of Cuisinarts in an RPM case in 1980.
Baxter, by contrast, was a believer in the generally benign nature of most vertical
relationships.16  For example, he understood and appreciated the Telser (1960) explanation of RPM: as
a manufacturer's response to the problems of free riding on information provision by distributors.  The
Division -- much to the consternation of many in Congress17 -- ceased bringing vertical restraints
cases18 and entered amicus briefs in favor of the defendants in a major tying case (Jefferson Parish19)
                                                                                                                                                      
     13 Continental T.V. v.  GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977); see also Preston (1994).
     14 U.S. v. Arnold, Schwinn and Co., et al., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
     15 Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
     16 For a broad overview of how economics and legal thinking had changed with respect to vertical
restraints by the 1980s, see White (1989).  For my views on vertical restraints at the time, see White
(1981, 1985a, 1989).
     17 Often overlooked in the Congressional criticism of Baxter's enforcement policies was the
continuing vigorous effort by the Division in prosecuting horizontal price-fixing conspiracies among
competing sellers, including hundreds of convictions of highway construction companies and
individuals.
     18 It is worth noting that the Division did stop a proposed merger that had a heavy vertical element;
see the text below.
     19 Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v.Edwin G. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); see also Lynk
(1999).
8and a major RPM case (Monsanto20).  The latter brief caused so much consternation on Capitol Hill
that a specific law (P.L. No. 98-166, Sec. 510) was passed to prevent the Division, in its oral argument
before the Supreme Court in Monsanto, from advocating any alteration (e.g., to a rule-of-reason
standard) in the Court's per se violation treatment of RPM.
Despite the Congress's fulminations, the Division and the FTC continued to refrain from
bringing vertical restraints cases through the remainder of the 1980s.  In 1985 the Division
promulgated a set of Vertical Restraints Guidelines that tried to provide clarity and guidance in the
vertical area and that clearly embodied a tolerant enforcement philosophy.  However, the Division
withdrew these Guidelines in 1993, and since then the Division and the FTC have brought some
vertical restraints cases, though more sparingly than had been true prior to 1981.
As for Monsanto, the Court (while finding the defendant Monsanto guilty and retaining the per
se treatment of RPM) did increase the evidentiary burden on plaintiffs in order to find a defendant
guilty of an RPM violation, and the Court increased the evidentiary burden still further four years later
in Sharp.21  Though the entire Court found in favor of the defendant in Jefferson Parish (on the grounds
that the defendant hospital did not possess market power), it narrowly (by a vote of 5-4) maintained a
formalistic posture of per se treatment of tying; the minority wanted instead to introduce a rule-of-
reason standard.  The Court's 1992 decision in another tying case, Kodak,22 may have been a step
                                               
     20 Monsanto Co. v.Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); see also Warren-Boulton
(1999).
     21 Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
     22 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); see also MacKie-
Mason and Metzler (1999).
9back.23  But in a 1997 decision in another RPM case, State Oil Co.,24 the Court reversed its earlier
(Albrecht25) per se violation standard for the practice of maximum RPM and established a rule-of-
reason standard for the practice of maximum RPM. This may be (as RPM's enthusiasts hope and its
critics fear) a first step toward a reevaluation of RPM more generally.
Perhaps antitrust policy would have reached its current position regardless of who occupied the
Assistant Attorney General's office in the early 1980s; but it seems more likely that Baxter's views and
actions accelerated the process.
4.  Invitations to fix prices.
As many undergraduate students of intermediate microeconomics have known for the past
decade (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1997, pp. 369-370, and earlier editions), in February of 1982 the
President and CEO of American Airlines, Robert Crandall, suggested in a telephone conversation with
the President and CEO of Braniff Airlines, Howard Putnam, that Braniff should raise its air fares by
20% and that American would follow "the next morning."  Braniff subsequently brought a tape of the
telephone conversation to the Division.26
The Division decided that it could not bring Sherman Act Section 1 price-fixing charges against
American and Crandall, since there had not been any actual or even attempted joint effort at price
                                               
     23 As MacKie-Mason and Metzler (1999) remind us, however, the narrow focus of the Court's
decision in Kodak concerned the burden on the defendant that was necessary to sustain a motion for
summary judgment in a case of this sort.
     24 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 66 L.W. 4001 (1997).
     25 Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
     26 Braniff at the time was facing hard times financially, had filed a predatory pricing suit against
American, and was hoping for any help that it could get from any quarter.
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fixing (i.e., no "contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade") -- only an invitation or
solicitation.  But in a novel use of Section 2 of the Sherman Act the Division in 1983 brought an
attempted monopolization case against American and Crandall: Since American and Braniff together
accounted for a high fraction of the flights and passengers in a number of city-pair air transportation
markets in the southwestern U.S., the attempted monopolization would have succeeded if Braniff had
agreed to raising prices.  Though the defendants won a motion for summary judgment at the Federal
District Court level, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a trial.27  American and
Crandall subsequently settled, with promises never to do it again combined with reporting obligations. 
Though the settlement might have been a bit weak, the Fifth Circuit's precedent was an important one.
Included in the Division's 1998 case against Microsoft is the allegation that in a June 21, 1998,
meeting between the senior managers of Microsoft and Netscape the former made an offer to divide
the market for Internet browsers between the two companies.28  Though the American/Crandall
precedent involved an invitation to an agreement on pricing and the alleged Microsoft incident involves
an invitation to an agreement to allocate a market, it seems highly likely that the precedent will indeed
be important.
5.  Stopping a vertical merger.
Though generally quite reluctant to bring vertical restraints cases, the Division did block a
merger that had substantial vertical elements.  As of 1982 the three major cable TV channels that
primarily showed recent movies as their staple fare were HBO (owned by Time, Inc.), Showtime
                                               
     27 U.S. v. American Airlines, Inc. and Robert L. Crandall, 743 F. 2d 1114.
     28 See Lohr (1998) for a journalistic account.
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(owned by Viacom), and The Movie Channel (TMC) (owned by Warner Communications and
American Express).29  In November 1982 Paramount Pictures, Universal Studios, Warner, and
American Express proposed a joint venture that would own and operate TMC.  In January 1983
Viacom entered the picture, and the proposal then involved a merger of Showtime and TMC, with the
three movie studios, Viacom, and American Express jointly owning the merged entity.  Thus, three of
the six major film studios would be co-owners of the joint venture.
In June 1983 the Division indicated its objections to the merger and joint venture.  Though the
Division's specific grounds were never publicly stated, the vertical arrangement between the venture
and the film studios provided the entity with an opportunity to raise rivals' costs (Salop and Scheffman,
1983, 1987), disadvantage HBO and potential entrants, and distort competition in the showing of
recent movies on cable (White, 1985b).  Paramount and Universal subsequently withdrew from the
venture, and the Division withdrew its objections.
To my knowledge, this was the only vertical merger challenged by the Division or the FTC
during the 1980s.  In the 1990s both agencies' renewed interest in vertical issues generated a renewed
concern about vertical mergers (Morse, 1998).  In most instances where either agency challenged a
vertical merger, a consent decree with modest contractual or behavioral requirements settled the matter
and permitted the merger to proceed.30  Only in 1998 did the DOJ challenge two mergers that required
                                               
     29 The three services accounted for 60%, 20%, and 10% of pay TV subscriptions.
     30 For discussions of two vertical cases -- Lockheed and Martin Marietta (1995); and Time Warner
and Turner Broadcasting (1996) -- that were approved by the FTC with modest behavioral and
contractual conditions imposed, see Nelson and Stoner (1999) and Besen et al. (1999), respectively. 
For brief discussions of other vertical mergers that eventually received consent-decree approval by the
DOJ or the FTC, see Morse (1998).
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a substantial divestiture before being permitted to proceed (Enova and Pacific Enterprises) or that
simply was dropped (Lockheed and Northrup).31
6.  Dropping the IBM case.
On January 8, 1982, the same day that he announced the AT&T settlement, Baxter also
announced his attention to drop the Division's thirteen-year-old IBM prosecution.  Though the merits
of the Division's original case against IBM might be debated (Brock, 1975; Fisher et al., 1983; Pittman,
1984; DeLamarter, 1986), it is clear that by 1982 the computer industry had changed substantially from
the structure-behavior-performance picture of the 1960s that had given rise to the suit.  The suit had
lasted for far too long without even reaching an initial decision by Federal District Court Judge David
Edelstein and had consumed far too much of the Division's resources and attention; the analogy that
many commentators have offered -- that the IBM case was the Division's Vietnam War -- is an apt one.
 Unfortunately, no solution comparable to Senator George Aiken's (paraphrased) suggestion for ending
the real war -- "Declare victory and bring the troops home" -- was available.
Dropping the case was the best available solution.
7.  Administrative/managerial issues
Despite many critics' claims that the economists were in the ascendancy at the Division, I
quickly discovered in early 1982 that the Division was still very much a legal organization that was run
by lawyers.  Baxter might be more sympathetic to economics arguments than were his predecessors,
and economists just might have a deserved reputation as "case killers" in the area of vertical restraints. 
Still, the EPO was just an "island" of about 40 economists in an "ocean" of about 300 lawyers.  Crucial
                                               
     31 As Morse (1998) points out, two earlier proposed mergers received FTC challenges that would
have required divestitures, but the mergers failed to proceed for other reasons.
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decisions were, in the end, always made by lawyers.  Indeed, as of 1981 the Division's organization
showed that the Director of EPO reported to the Deputy AAG for Regulation rather than directly to
the AAG.
In my pre-appointment discussions with Baxter I asked that the position of EPO Director be
elevated to that of Deputy AAG; Baxter demurred, arguing that the political and bureaucratic problems
within the DOJ would be too great.  As a fall-back position I asked that the organization chart of the
Division be redrawn to show the EPO Director as reporting directly to the AAG, as an alternative way
of assuring that economists would have direct access to the Division's decision-making process (and as
a way of strengthening that link for future EPO Directors and AAGs); Baxter agreed.  I was quite
pleased when my successor, Frederick Warren-Boulton, convinced Douglas Ginsberg, then AAG, that
the position should be elevated to Deputy AAG, where it remains today.
III.  The Disappointments32
1.  Market delineation for monopolization cases.33
There has been no progress in developing a market delineation paradigm, comparable to the
Merger Guidelines' market delineation paradigm, for cases in which monopolization, or the exercise of
                                               
     32 As will be clear from the text below I have included here a mixture of disappointments over
decisions that were taken at the time and frustrations (some involving "20/20 hindsight") at the lack of
legal and/or economics progress since then.
     33 In White (1999a) I expand further on this theme.
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market power, is alleged.34  In the absence of a paradigm, however, the following conundrum arises:  It
is a core proposition in microeconomics that a profit-maximizing monopolist will maintain its price at a
level (as compared with an otherwise similar group of competitors) that is higher and in doing so
experiences a lower volume of sales than the competitive industry would have experienced.  In essence,
the monopolist maintains its price at a level that implies the loss of sales (to other sellers of something)
as compared with the outcome for the competitive industry.  Equivalently, the monopolist can always
claim, truthfully, that it faces "competition" from other firms and that if it tried to raise its price from
current levels it would lose too many sales to those firms.  The Merger Guidelines' market delineation
paradigm, based on a prospective price increase, is thus not applicable for the delineation of the market
of a monopolist (or, equivalently, for the determination of the existence of market power).
As a consequence, any entity that is accused of having market power35 can and will always
claim that it faces competitors, that these competitors ought to be included within any delineation of a
relevant market, and that the entity therefore does not possess market power.  A failure to recognize
that this presence of competitors may be the consequence of market power (i.e., the maintenance of
price above the competitive level) has frequently been termed the "cellophane fallacy," referring to a
1956 Supreme Court decision.36
                                               
     34 These cases, of course, run the gamut from simple monopolization through predatory behavior
and vertical restraints.  A threshold issue in many of the cases in the latter two categories is whether the
defendant has market power.
     35 As Werden (1999) points out, where the plaintiff is complaining about prospective actions by the
defendant, the Merger Guidelines' market delineation paradigm may well be applicable, since the
relevant question (in essence) would be, "Will this prospective action make things worse (e.g., allow
prices to be raised)?"
     36 U.S. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).  The DOJ claimed that Du Pont
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A natural supplementary piece of information would seem to be the profits of the monopolist. 
But, since the early 1980s a set of critiques (Benston, 1982; Fisher and McGowan, 1983; Fisher, 1984)
have argued that the standard accounting data that are used to report corporate profits are unreliable
indicators of true economic profits, casting doubt on this route to the demonstration of market power.
Efforts to demonstrate that a firm is exercising market power thus face a quandary:  Both a
true monopolist and a firm that truly has no market power will be observed to face competitors, and
profit data may not be reliable enough to establish the former's excess profits.  Crucial here is the
absence of a market delineation paradigm that would somehow specify market boundaries that are free
of the distortions created by a monopolist's elevated price.37
In some instances, as in the Staples case discussed above, the availability of price data at the
local or regional level, along with data on local seller concentration and other relevant variables, may
allow tests for the existence of markets and market power.  But the presence of a guiding paradigm
would surely help structure the empirical analysis for monopolization inquiries.
Perhaps the goal of developing a market delineation paradigm for monopolization purposes is
utopian.  But its absence will guaranty a continued pattern of arbitrary and erratic outcomes in antitrust
cases involving allegations of monopolization.
                                                                                                                                                      
had a monopoly of cellophane; Du Pont claimed that the relevant market was "flexible wrapping
materials," of which it had only a modest share.  The Supreme Court decided in Du Pont's favor,
ignoring information that indicated that it was Du Pont's elevated price (which yielded above-normal
profits) that caused other flexible wrapping materials to be competitive with cellophane.  See Stocking
and Mueller (1955).  For a more recent discussion (of the IBM case) that commits the same fallacy, see
Fisher et al. (1983).
     37 It would seem that a solution to this dilemma would be to try to specify which firms would be in
competition with an alleged monopolist if the latter sold at lower prices that reflected only normal
profits.  But this approach again runs aground on the problem of profit measurement.
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2.  The GTE-Sprint merger.
In October 1982 GTE proposed to purchase Sprint from the Southern Pacific Company.  Prior
to the break-up of AT&T, GTE was the second largest provide of local telephone service in the U.S.,
with pockets of local service scattered across the country.  Sprint was the second largest "independent"
(i.e., non-AT&T) provider of long-distance service (after MCI).
The theory that underlay the AT&T divestiture pointed toward the potential anti-competitive
consequences of this merger:  GTE could use its position as the provider of regulated bottleneck
monopoly local service to distort competition and to favor its Sprint subsidiary with respect to the
long-distance calls originated (and possibly even those terminated) in its local service areas.  But, unlike
the AT&T case, there were no "smoking guns," no history and stories of bad behavior by GTE. 
However, the AT&T case had been a Sherman Act Section 2 monopolization case, whereas the
proposed merger was being considered under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, and enforcement of
Section 7 is based on likelihoods of prospective anti-competitive behavior.  Smoking guns should not
have been necessary.  And the AT&T theory and evidence pointed toward those likelihoods.
Nevertheless, the Division decided not to oppose the merger.  At least part of the reason was
fears that an unfavorable judicial decision in a challenge to the GTE-Sprint merger might cause the
AT&T settlement to be re-opened, judicially or politically, and the Division's substantial achievement in
that settlement might be lost.  The Division settled for a mild consent decree in which GTE promised to
operate Sprint as a separate subsidiary and not to discriminate against other long-distance carriers.
Ironically, in a part of the litigation that followed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and
delayed its implementation, SBC (one of the local Bell operating companies -- i.e., one of the AT&T
"offspring") claimed that the Act unfairly and unconstitutionally discriminated against the local Bell
17
operating companies, since other (non-Bell) local operating companies (like GTE) are not subject to
the same requirements to open their networks to entrants and to the same constraints on entering long-
distance service.38  If the Division had decided to oppose the GTE-Sprint merger (and had succeeded),
this argument would have had less force.
3.  AT&T and cellular telephone service.
After a decade of regulatory delay, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the
early 1980s finally decided to authorize the provision of cellular telephone service (Hausman 1997). 
The FCC's initial approach was to allocate two cellular service licenses to each major metropolitan area
and to insist that one of those licenses in each area should be assigned to the local "wireline" company,
which in most instances would be the local AT&T subsidiary.  The FCC reasoned that the local
companies were in the best position technologically to offer the service, thereby encouraging its rapid
development.
In the AT&T divestiture that split the local Bell operating companies from AT&T's long-
distance and equipment operations, the cellular services stayed with the local operating companies.  It
is not clear whether this was a conscious decision or whether cellular was just automatically deemed to
be local.
However, the Division instead might have insisted that all cellular services should stay with
AT&T.  It is unlikely that the FCC would have objected, since its major concern was technological
competence (and AT&T surely was thought to have that).  And it seems unlikely that the AT&T
                                               
     38 SBC ultimately lost its legal battle, though it did succeed in delaying the implementation of the
Telecommunications Act.  See SBC Communications v. FCC, No. 98-10140 (5th Circuit, September
23, 1998).
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negotiators would have objected strongly.
The consequence would have been two separate companies, other than the local operating
company, offering cellular service.  It seems likely that competition would have been sharper.  This
surely was a missed opportunity.
4.  Building on the American/Crandall precedent.
As was discussed above, the American/Crandall case was an innovative and important victory
for the Division.  But since then there have been only a few low-profile DOJ cases39 and a few low-
profile FTC consent decrees.40  Only in the DOJ's prosecution of the Microsoft case has the invitation-
to-collude issue gained a high profile.
Why this relative lack of use?  It is clear that any invitations to raise prices or to divide markets
are going to be private communications.  Either they will be agreed to, and then if the conspirators are
caught, it is the agreement that will be the subject of the prosecution; or they will be rebuffed, in which
case the parties most likely will go their separate ways, and there is no strong incentive for the recipient
to report the invitation to the Division or the Commission.  It takes a disgruntled recipient (like Braniff
or Netscape) to consider a report to the antitrust authorities to be worthwhile.
So, have there simply been few such rebuffed invitations?  Or just few disgruntled recipients? 
Without more information, it is impossible to know.  It seems unlikely, however, that such invitations
are few, since this would imply that virtually all invitations to price fixing are accepted.41  And the
                                               
     39 See, for example, U.S. v. Ames Sintering Co., 927 F.2d 232 (1990).
     40 See, for example, "Decision and Order," In the Matter of Precision Moulding Co. Inc., FTC
Docket No. C-3682 (September 3, 1996).
     41 We start out, however, not knowing the total volume of invitations, since we learn primarily
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potential social harm from such invitations is high.  They are dangerous because they are private and
hard to detect, as is any subsequent agreement; indeed, the difficulty in detecting price-fixing
arrangements is the major justification for the treble damages penalty structure (Becker 1968; Becker
and Stigler 1974).
Perhaps such rebuffed invitations really are rare, in which case there is little to worry about. 
Since this is unlikely and the invitations are dangerous, the Division should publicize more effectively
the anti-social and illegal nature of such invitations (e.g., by "high-profiling" such prosecutions) and
should devise ways to induce the recipients of such invitations to report them to the Division.  Bounties
for evidence leading to successful prosecutions are certainly one possibility.
5.  Clarifying predatory behavior.
Distinguishing predatory pricing and other predatory behavior, on the one hand, from merely
aggressive competitive behavior, on the other hand, has been a continuing problem for antitrust policy.
 The Areeda-Turner rule (Areeda and Turner, 1975) has helped, as have other innovations.  Still, the
problem remains, as is revealed by the differing views of Microsoft's behavior that have emerged in the
Division's 1998 suit against Microsoft.
There are, however, some behaviors that even sharp critics of antitrust policy would consider
predatory and worthy of condemnation: dynamiting a rival's factory, for example.  In 1982 the Division
had a potential opportunity to establish at least one bound on aggressive behavior, by pursuing a case
that (in this author's opinion) involved behavior that was akin to dynamiting.
The case came to the attention of the Division through an article in the Columbia Journalism
                                                                                                                                                      
about the invitations that are made, accepted, and then detected and prosecuted.
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Review (Tate 1981).  Briefly, in 1974 the Gannett newspaper group acquired two daily newspapers in
Salem, Oregon: the Oregon Statesman and the Capital Journal.  The two papers had been previously
separately owned but had joined their non-editorial operations in 1954.  Subsequent to the 1974
acquisition, Gannett raised advertising rates substantially, which alienated local advertisers who then
urged a Portland-based publisher of community weeklies to begin publishing in Salem.  The latter
company began publishing a free weekly, the Community Press, in March 1976 and attracted a
substantial amount of local advertising; the Community Press soon expanded to twice-a-week
publication.
Gannett, dismayed by the losses of advertising to its new rival, in June appointed a new
publisher in Salem and a new marketing director.  This new local leadership took an aggressive
approach toward the Community Press, launching "operation demolition," which had as its goal "to
fatally cripple The Community Press."42  Besides "normal" aggressive sales efforts to re-attract
advertisers to the Gannett papers, the marketing director also established a bonus system for sales
representatives who could show simply that they had caused an advertiser to cease using the
Community Press, regardless of whether the advertiser instead used the Gannett papers.
Gannett's campaign eventually succeeded.  The Community Press ceased publication in
September 1978 and filed state and federal antitrust suits against Gannett.  The suits were eventually
settled, with the documents sealed by court order (although some of them were accidently made
public).
By the time that the incident came to the attention of the Division the statute-of-limitations
                                               
     42 These phrases were used in Gannett documents.
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four-year limit on the ability to prosecute Gannett's actions was expiring, or might have already
expired; the information available to the Division was murky.  The Division declined to act.
In my view, the act of rewarding sales representatives for simply showing that they had
removed advertising from a rival newspaper is perilously close to dynamiting a rival's factory.  It is
difficult to see any offsetting social gain that is achieved by such actions.  A successful prosecution of
Gannett would have established at least one clear boundary in an otherwise murky area.43
6.  Structuring incentives in divestitures.
A difficult issue that arose during 1982-1983 in some merger negotiations between prospective
merger partners and the Division and that is a recurring problem for the Division (and the FTC) in
merger enforcement involves requirements for the divestiture of duplicative facilities so as to lessen
seller concentrations in relevant markets.  The problem also arises when monopolists are required to
divest facilities, though the latter event occurs far less frequently.
In such situations the incentives of the Division and of the merging parties diverge sharply.  The
Division would like the entity that buys the facilities to be the most vigorous competitor possible; the
merging parties would like the entity to be the weakest competitor possible -- ideally, one that fails
immediately.44  These considerations will influence not only the seller's preference as to the buyer of the
                                               
     43 Also, from a strategic perspective the timing of the suit would have been propitious, since
Gannett was then launching its new USA Today and would have likely been eager to avoid a
continuing stream of bad publicity and reach an accommodation with the Division (which the Division
nevertheless could have used as a precedent to put others on notice).
     44 Alternatively, the merging parties might want to sell the facilities to a new entity that will go along
with collusive activities.  Again, this is at odds with the Division's goals.
22
facilities but also the structuring of exactly what is sold and how attractive and viable it is.45
Similarly, if a firm is exiting an industry (e.g., a failing firm or simply a firm that does not
foresee successful outcomes in the industry) and is trying to sell its assets, an incumbent that has
market power will place a higher value on the assets (since their purchase will help the incumbent to
preserve its excess profits) than will any challenger (since the challenger's expectations would be a
more competitive environment).  The selling firm would prefer to sell at the higher price to the
incumbent with market power; the Division would prefer a sale to the challenger.
In both types of situations the Division must adopt a highly regulatory posture, making detailed
choices about purchasers and the viability of competition.  Instead, the ideal would be the development
of some form of an incentive-compatible mechanism whereby the seller's incentives were aligned with
those of the Division, and the Division could step back and let the seller's (properly aligned) incentives
drive the process.
Unfortunately, to my knowledge no such mechanism has been developed.  Perhaps this goal is
utopian.  But in its absence, the regulatory posture will continue.
7.  Distinguishing vertical restraints from conspiracies.
As was the practice both before and after the Baxter era, the Division had an active program of
entering amicus briefs in private antitrust cases that the Division thought were important and where its
brief might help clarify issues and influence decisions in sensible directions.  Amicus briefs might be
entered in cases being considered by the Supreme Court or even by the various circuit courts of appeal.
                                               
     45 The seller's receipt of the proceeds from the sale of the facilities may provide a partial offset;
presumably, a buyer that is more optimistic about its prospective viability would be willing to pay more
than a buyer that was more pessimistic.  But the proceeds from the sale cannot completely offset the
reductions in profits that would accompany more vigorous competition by a more viable purchaser.
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 Given Baxter's stance with respect to vertical restraints, private suits involving vertical restraints were
given special scrutiny for opportunities to move judicial opinions in more tolerant directions.
One of the private vertical restraints cases that was considered for an amicus brief in early 1982
was Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Memorial Park Cemetery Association, 666 F.2d 1130 (1981). 
Briefly, Rosebrough was a manufacturer of burial monuments and markers and also provided
monument foundation preparation services.  The Memorial Park Cemetery Association was a trade
association of eleven St. Louis area cemeteries.  The trade association had a rule, followed by all
members, that required purchasers of cemetery plots to purchase also from the cemetery the cemetery's
own memorial foundation preparation services.
Rosebrough filed a federal antitrust suit against the association and its members charging that
the rule was an illegal conspiracy to enforce illegal tying.  The defendants argued that the sale of a
cemetery plot and foundation preparation service was a single product and that the tie was justified by
the cemeteries' ownership interests in the property and their statutory responsibility to provide
perpetual care.
The District Court decision went in favor of the defendants.46  Rosebrough appealed, and the
Eighth Circuit reversed and held that the trade association's rule was an illegal conspiracy under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act and that the tying arrangement was illegal.  The defendants were seeking
an appeal of the Eighth Circuit's decision to the Supreme Court when the case was reviewed by the
Division for a possible amicus brief.47
                                               
     46 Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Memorial Park Cemetery Association, 505 F. Supp. 525 (1980).
     47 Since the Supreme Court has the discretion in most cases as to whether to grant an appeal, it
usually first requires briefs submitted by the parties that address the question of whether the Court
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The case could have been a good opportunity to distinguish two principles that had been
muddied by the Eighth Circuit.  On the one hand, the tie of the foundation preparation service to the
sale of the plot, if it were specified by an individual cemetery, should not have been objectionable.  An
individual cemetery would be unlikely to have market power, and the cemetery's interests in
maintaining the appearance of the property was a reasonable justification.  Even if all of the cemeteries
came to this conclusion, so long as they did so independently with no hint of collusion, this would still
be unobjectionable.  But there was no sensible reason why all of the cemeteries needed to agree that
they would all observe this tying arrangement through their trade association rule.  That agreement had
all of the indicia of an illegal conspiracy.  So the Eighth Circuit's decision was only half right, and a
clarification would have been useful.48
But the Division had limited time and attention resources, and it did not file a brief.
Subsequent events were as follows: The defendants' request for Supreme Court review was
denied (457 U.S. 1111 [1982]).  The case returned to the District Court, where the judge entered an
order that enjoined the tying and specified a set of rules indicating what standards the cemeteries could
set with respect to foundation preparation services.49  Rosebrough was unhappy with any specification
of rules, hoping that the specifics would be left to each cemetery, and was also unhappy with some of
the rules that had been specified; Rosebrough again appealed to the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed the
                                                                                                                                                      
should consider the appeal.  The Division was considering the possibility of an amicus brief at this first
stage.
     48 Also, as was discussed above, Baxter's activities and philosophy with respect to vertical restraints
had generated considerable political hostility.  An amicus brief that indicated that the Division was not
prepared to bless all vertical restraints under all circumstances might have had some value.
     49 Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Memorial Park Cemetery Association, 1983-2 Trade Cases
25
District Court's general power to set rules but then modified and overturned some of them as unduly
favoring the defendants.50  The distinction between the conspiracy among the cemeteries in agreeing on
the tying arrangement and the propriety of an individual cemetery's tying arrangement was never
addressed.
This was a missed opportunity.
IV. Epilogue
My experience at the Antitrust Division during 1982-1983 was an exciting, fascinating, and
rewarding one.  I learned a lot from the economists and lawyers at the Division during my nineteen
months of service.  I returned to NYU in the fall of 1983 a better economist with a much deeper
appreciation for the complexities and challenges of antitrust economics, antitrust law, and antitrust
policy and administration.
There were many achievements during my tour of duty that I continue to remember with great
pride.  There were also multiple frustrations and disappointments.  The net was strongly positive.
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